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ARTICLES 
IN SUPREME JUDGMENT OF THE POOR:  
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN  
WELFARE LAW AND POLICY  
Bridgette Baldwin * 
“Welfare reform punishes the poor for being poor.  
Our responsibility . . . is to end poverty as we know it, not welfare.”  
S. Clara Kim1 
© Bridgette Baldwin. The author retains all rights to this article. For permission to reprint 
this article, contact the author directly at bbaldwin@law.wnec.edu. 
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greatly appreciate helpful insights from Jennifer Hamer, Shywon Berry and the anonymous 
readers in making revisions. And along with them, thank you to my colleagues, Tina Cafaro, 
Lauren Carasik, Jocelyn Cuffee, Jennifer Levi and Sudha Setty and Managing Editor, Megan 
Calvo. Finally, a very special "thank you" to Davarian Baldwin for numerous draft readings. 
1. S. CLARA KIM, PROS AND CONS: SOCIAL POLICY DEBATES OF OUR TIME 276 (2001) 
(citation omitted). 
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INTRODUCTION 
At its onset, welfare was reserved almost exclusively for white women. At 
that time, poverty was understood to be a cause of temporary societal inequity, 
and welfare was a socially­acceptable solution  to  those temporary setbacks. 2 
However,  as Black women  entered  the welfare rolls,  racialized  presumptions 
about behavior and poverty began to structure the very contours of welfare law. 
Welfare and poverty in  general came under political attack.3 With  increasing 
welfare rolls and the changing racial composition of recipients, Congress began 
to  respond  to arguments that poverty was a product of culture, behavior,  and 
even biologically determined racial traits. 4 Consequently, Congress started  to 
limit benefits for those deemed “undeserving.”5 Welfare legislation and policy 
implementation  were less attempts to  protect citizens by subsidizing  an 
economic downturn than the manifestation of an effort to limit citizens’ (Black 
women in particular) access to state power and benefits. More and more, Black 
working­class recipients saw the courts,  juxtaposed with  the overwhelmingly 
antagonistic spaces of the local welfare offices and the floor of Congress,  as 
their most viable sites of struggle and social possibility for a more humane 
social welfare worldview.6 
Legal decisions are a key way of understanding the larger discussions and 
debates within welfare policy and the implications of such policy on the lives 
of many working­class Black women. While the United States Supreme Court 
(Supreme Court) has not decided  a significant number of cases with  direct 
bearing  on  welfare policy, many important and  historic cases structuring 
current welfare policy and reform were resolved from the 1960s to the present.7 
These decisions raised major questions about the parameters and constraints of 
welfare entitlement.8 Discussions of the intent and  impact of welfare policy 
generally focus on  the congressional floor,  media representations,  or the 
caseworker­client relationship.9 This leaves the courts (and the Supreme Court 
in  particular) inadequately examined  as a key institutional space where the 
social policy of welfare is implemented. 
This article will examine the major Supreme Court rulings since the late 
1960s that have directly addressed Aid  to  Families with Dependent Children 
2. See JOANNE L. GOODWIN, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM: 
MOTHER’S PENSION IN CHICAGO (1911­1929) 16 (1997). 
3. See generally ELIZABETH BUSSIERE, (DIS)ENTITLING THE POOR: THE WARREN 
COURT, WELFARE RIGHTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION (1997). 
4. See ANGE­MARIE HANCOCK, THE POLITICS OF DISGUST: THE PUBLIC IDENTITY OF THE 
WELFARE QUEEN 57­60, 95­106 (2004). 
5. Id. 
6. See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (1960­1973) 1 (1993). 
7. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 
(1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
8. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; King, 392 U.S. at 309. 
9. See generally HANCOCK, supra note 4 (discussing congressional, media and 
individual perceptions of welfare recipients). 
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(AFDC), commonly known as welfare. The Supreme Court decided cases, such 
10 11 12 as King v. Smith, Shapiro v. Thompson, and Goldberg v. Kelly, in favor of 
welfare recipients.13 The outcomes of these cases suggest that while the 
Supreme Court viewed  welfare policy as a negotiation  between  federal and 
state governments,14 it reserved  a special role for the judicial branch  in 
protecting equal rights. The judicial understanding of the relationship between 
federal and  state government power within  welfare policy ranged  from 
“cooperative federalism,” (expanding  powers of the national government in 
areas traditionally left to  the states) to  fiscal conservatism (privileging  state 
power and proffering a hands­off approach). These conceptual rubrics do not 
follow a linear narrative nor offer a story of change over time; instead they are 
competing  approaches that can  be implemented  by the Supreme Court 
simultaneously. 
While the historical arch from the Civil Rights Era to the present normally 
presents a story of expanded  liberties and  freedoms to  the socially 
disenfranchised,15 the lens of the Supreme Court welfare decisions narrates a 
much  different story. Instead,  we see the devolution  of racial liberalism,  the 
intensification and expansion of poverty, and the rise of social conservatism so 
familiar by the mid­1980s.16 Here,  Black  women  became both  the symbolic 
scapegoat and  the site of social policy surveillance.  At the apex  of this 
symbolic/social policy convergence were national attacks on  the stereotyped 
“welfare queen” in particular, and any redistribution of national resources to the 
poor,  in general. Part I of this paper examines Supreme Court case law on 
welfare policy through  the lens of the Due Process and  Equal Protection 
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part II surveys the Supreme Court case 
law on welfare policy through the lens of federalism. Finally, Part III reviews 
10. King, 392 U.S. at 309. 
11. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618. 
12. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254. 
13. It is important to note that while not all of the plaintiffs (welfare recipients) 
presented in this article are African­American mothers, welfare has traditionally been 
racialized. At the center of America’s attitude about welfare policy is race and racism and, 
therefore, African­American mothers were routinely held out as iconographic images of who 
was on welfare. Moreover, since African­American mothers were disproportionately poor, 
any laws regulating entitlement to welfare assistance would also have a disparate impact on 
them. For causal certainty, it should also be noted that many of the major figures in these 
cases were black women. See, e.g., Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; 
King, 392 U.S. at 309. 
14. See, e.g., Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 645 (Warren, J., dissenting); King, 392 U.S. at 316. 
15. See DAVID A. HOLLINGER, POSTETHNIC AMERICA: BEYOND MULTICULTURALISM 
(1995). For a critique of this vision, see generally CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT 
OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1995) 
and NIKHIL PAL SINGH, BLACK IS A COUNTRY: RACE AND THE UNFINISHED STRUGGLE OF 
DEMOCRACY (2004). 
16. See, e.g., ROBERT O. SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR 
POSTWAR OAKLAND (2003); THOMAS J. SUGRUE, THE ORIGINS OF THE URBAN CRISIS: RACE 
AND INEQUALITY IN POST­WAR DETROIT (1996); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY 
DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1990). 
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much of the same case law contrasted through the lens of fiscal conservatism. 
Through  these lenses,  it is clear that the seemingly value­neutral Supreme 
Court was not at all immune to  the changing political landscape of the nation 
over the last forty years. 
I. DUE PROCESS, EQUAL PROTECTION AND FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
A.  	Substantive Constitutional Rights: Equal Protection and the Fundamental 
Right to Travel 
During  the Warren  Court (1953­1969) and  well into  the Burger Court 
(1969­1986),17 the concept of equal protection  under the law accelerated 
rapidly as a new “interventionist” instrument.18 The Supreme Court under Chief 
Justice Earl Warren  still employed  a modest approach  toward  review of 
legislative policies,  but the Supreme Court granted  certain  cases more active 
scrutiny.19 Particularly during  Warren’s tenure,  more issues were reviewed 
using a strict scrutiny approach.20 Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review 
used by the Supreme Court to  review any government laws and policies that 
restrict or limit a constitutional right.21 When a government attempts to impose 
legislation which  infringes on  a fundamental right or interest22 or enacts 
17. For a survey of Supreme Court cases decided during the first term of the Burger 
Court era, see Gerald Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on Changing a 
Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
18. Id. During Justice Warren’s tenure, a two­tier system of review was employed in 
cases involving Equal Protection claims. In most circumstances, equal protection claims 
would fail because the Supreme Court would find that the statute in question was 
constitutional because the legislative body had a reasonable purpose for the particular 
discriminatory practice in place. However, when the statute in question employed a 
discriminatory practice based on race, alienage or lineage (suspect classifications) or 
encroached a fundamental right or interest, the governing body would have to show more 
than a reasonable purpose. On such occasions the Supreme Court would apply a higher level 
of scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of a law. For a survey of the equal protection 
doctrine, see generally, Developments in the Law—Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 
1065, 1076­1192 (1969); Lawrence Schlam, Equality in Culture and Law: An Introduction 
to the Origins and Evolution of the Equal Protection Principle, 24 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 425, 
445­456 (2004); Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 
CAL. L. REV. 341, 343­365 (1949). 
19. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 254; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618; King, 392 U.S. at 309. 
20. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 
(1969); Abbington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 
335, 343 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of 
Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). 
21. See generally United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(hinting for the first time at a heightened level of scrutiny when “prejudice against discrete 
and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and 
which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
22. A fundamental right or interest is one that has its foundation from the Constitution, 
like the Bill of Rights, the right to vote, the right to travel and the right to privacy. See, e.g., 
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legislation  that targets groups identified  as a suspect class (groups legally 
identified  by race,  nationality,  or alienage)23 the Supreme Court approves of 
such  legislation  only if the government can  show that the particular law is 
essential,  narrowly tailored,  and the least restrictive means to  accomplish  its 
goal.24 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees an 
independent constitutional right that similarly situated  citizens be treated 
similarly under the law.25 Within  welfare law,  states may not have directly 
attempted  to  violate the Equal Protection  Clause,  but nevertheless created 
separate rules for its recipients based on gender,26 socioeconomic status,27 and 
Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (acknowledging that rights 
established in the first amendment are fundamental rights); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 
U.S. 479, 484­85 (1965) (providing examples of fundamental guarantees). 
23. In order to qualify as a suspect class, a social group’s characteristics must be 
immutable, the group must suffer from a history of discrimination, the group must be 
politically impotent, and the group must constitute a distinct and insular minority. Suspect 
class refers to a group that has been historically discriminated against in the political process. 
For information on how a suspect class is defined, see Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 7­9 
(1977). See also Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 477­78 (1954) (implying that persons of 
Mexican descent constitute a suspect class); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 
(1944) (referencing race as a suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny review); Yick 
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) (implying that persons of Chinese descent 
constitute a suspect class). 
24. See generally Joel F. Handler, “Constructing Political Spectacle”: The 
Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History, 56 
BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
25. “State[s] [shall not] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a survey of the tiers of review used to analyze the 
Equal Protection Doctrine, see Edward J. Imwinkelried, Of Evidence and Equal Protection: 
The Unconstitutionality of Excluding Government Agents' Statements Offered as Vicarious 
Admissions Against the Prosecution, 71 MINN. L. REV. 269, 291­97 (1986). See generally 
Robert F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1195 
(1985). 
26. The Court has been reticent to apply the strict scrutiny to cases involving 
discriminatory treatment on the basis of gender. However, classifications based on gender 
are considered quasi­suspect, thus triggering an intermediate review between rational basis 
and strict scrutiny analysis. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 731 (1982) 
(holding that a law discriminating on the basis of the male sex does not relieve it from the 
heightened level of scrutiny); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (describing the 
appropriate level of review for gender classifications); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 682 (1973) (plurality opinion) (ruling that gender classifications are analogous to race 
discrimination and therefore should be subjected to strict scrutiny). 
27. The Supreme Court has rejected the notion that wealth (or lack of wealth) alone is 
enough to trigger strict scrutiny. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
1, 28­29 (1973) (concluding that poverty is not a suspect class and statutes challenged on this 
basis will receive rational basis review); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 184­85 (1941) 
(stating that “indigence in itself is a neutral fact—constitutionally an irrelevance, like race, 
creed, or color.”). But see Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (holding 
that a poll tax in order to vote was unconstitutional), and Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18­
19 (1956) (holding that it violated equal protection to deny free trial transcripts to indigent 
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status of non­marital children.28 Many states also created durational residency 
restrictions to  control the skyrocketing  state welfare rolls and  the belief that 
people migrated  across state lines in  pursuit of the most generous monthly 
welfare payment.29 Under most state regulations, in order to be eligible for aid, 
a person had to be a resident of the county/state for at least a year.30 In effect, 
states could deny otherwise eligible persons aid simply because they had failed 
to  live in  the geographical area for the minimum statutory period  of time.31 
When  the state took  such  action,  the Supreme Court reviewed  the law to 
determine if the groups of people identified by the law were a protected class, 
or if the law violated  a fundamental interest or right guaranteed by the 
Constitution.32 
By way of example, in the case of Shapiro, the Supreme Court was asked 
to  determine the constitutionality of conditioning  receipt of welfare aid  on 
residency restrictions.33 Single Black  mothers challenged  the residency 
requirements of Connecticut,  the District of Columbia,  and  Pennsylvania.34 
Pursuant to  their welfare policy,  respective states denied  single mothers 
benefits under AFDC if they resided  in  the state for less than  one year. 35 
Congress had authorized  this residency restriction36 and, therefore,  the states’ 
welfare policies were in compliance with federal law.37 
criminal defendants). For a discussion suggesting that claims made based on discrimination 
against the poor should receive strict scrutiny, see Stephen Loffredo, Poverty, Democracy 
and Constitutional Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1993). 
28. Similar to gender classification, the Supreme Court has been reticent to apply strict 
scrutiny to cases involving discriminatory treatment on the basis of illegitimacy. However, 
the Supreme Court has admonished states not to favor “legitimate” children over 
“illegitimate” children. N.J. Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 621 (1973); Gomez 
v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 176 
(1972); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968). 
29. For an example of residence requirements and voting restrictions, see e.g., Dunn v. 
Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 360 (1972) (striking down a Tennessee statute which required a 
one year residence in the state as a condition for voting). 
30. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969). 
31. KENNETH NEUBECK & NOEL A. CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: PLAYING THE RACE 
CARD AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR 61 (2001). 
32. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969). 
33. Id. 
34. Id.; see also Ernest N. Blasingame, Jr., Comment, Public Welfare and Public 
Housing: Due Process and Equal Protection Standards, 38 TENN. L. REV. 345, 347 (1971). 
35. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 623­27; see also DAVIS, supra note 6, at 77. 
36. For background on the history of residency restrictions in welfare policy, see 
James R. Kristy, Note and Comment, A Showdown Between Shapiro and the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act: Infringement of the Right to 
Travel, 20 WHITTIER L. REV. 449, 452­64 (1998). 
37. 42 U.S.C § 602(b) (1958); Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 639. According to A.P. van der 
Mei, the states in the case argued that the real issue in Shapiro was whether Congress had the 
authority to authorize states to impose residency requirements. A.P. van der Mei, Freedom of 
Movement for Indigents: A Comparative Analysis of American Constitutional Law and 
European Community Law, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. LAW 803, 818 (2002). 
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The Supreme Court granted  a victory to  the welfare rights movement 
when  it struck  down  the residency requirement statute as an  unconstitutional 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the fundamental right to  travel.38 
The Supreme Court found that conditioning  welfare benefits on  residency 
requirements “create[d] a classification  which  constitute[d] an  invidious 
discrimination denying . . . [welfare recipients] equal protection of the laws”39 
and  impinged  upon  their fundamental right to  travel.40 While Supreme Court 
decisions on the right to travel have varied, the core underpinnings of travel as 
a fundamental right can be found within  the meaning of the Equal Protection 
Clause.41 Legal scholar A.P. van der Mei notes that “the personal right to move 
freely from state to  state is a product of this political Union  and  it occupies 
within the constitutional system ‘a more protected’” status.42 
While the Supreme Court in  Shapiro recognized  the state’s interest in 
preserving the integrity of its programs—saving money and keeping its welfare 
rolls down—the Supreme Court ruled  that residency requirements were 
unconstitutional because they failed to meet the “stricter standard of whether it 
promotes a compelling state interest,”43 and served “‘no other purpose . . . than 
to chill the assertion of constitutional rights by penalizing those who chose to 
exercise them .  .  .  .’” 44 In applying  the more heightened  level of review,  the 
Supreme Court took  into  account the socio­economic context where the 
modernization  of agricultural labor pushed  many unskilled  farm laborers to 
urban and northern communities in  search of employment.45 When  jobs were 
unavailable,  the only means of subsistence was the local welfare program.46 
38. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638. 
39. Id. at 627. 
40. Id. at 638. 
41. Jide Nzelibe, Free Movement: A Federalist Interpretation, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 433 
(1999). See also C. Thomas Dienes, To Feed the Hungry: Judicial Retrenchment in Welfare 
Adjudication, 58 CAL. L. REV. 555, 593­600 (1970); Bernard Evans Harvith, Federal Equal 
Protection and Welfare Assistance, 31 ALB. L. REV. 210, 222­26 (1967). 
42. A.P. van der Mei, supra note 37, at 811 (quoting Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 
160, 177 (1941)). 
43. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 638 (emphasis omitted). 
44. Id. at 631 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 581 (1968)). 
45. See generally Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro­
Marriage Moral Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 39 (2004) 
(discussing the general movement towards industrialization). 
46. 
[A] State may no more try to fence out those indigents who seek higher welfare 
benefits than it may try to fence out indigents generally. Implicit in any such 
distinction is the notion that indigents who enter a State with the hope of 
securing higher welfare benefits are somehow less deserving than indigents who 
do not take this consideration into account. But we do not perceive why a mother 
who is seeking to make a new life for herself and her children should be 
regarded as less deserving because she considers, among others [sic] factors, the 
level of a State's public assistance. Surely such a mother is no less deserving 
than a mother who moves into a particular State in order to take advantage of its 
better educational facilities. 
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The Supreme Court found that the one­year waiting period  created  two 
categories of eligible recipients who  were distinguished  by the number of 
months they had  resided  in  the respective states47 and  ruled  that “any 
classification  which  serves to  penalize the exercise of that right [to  travel], 
unless shown  to be necessary to  promote a compelling  [state] interest is 
unconstitutional.”48 Scholars Kenneth Neubeck and Noel Cazenave argue that if 
the Supreme Court had  sustained  state residency requirements, many citizens 
would have had no means of livelihood.49 Therefore, in Shapiro, the Supreme 
Court was unwilling to apply a lower level of scrutiny and refused to accept the 
states’ contention that (1) the states’ objectives justified imposing a residency 
restriction and (2) that any rational relationship existed between these identified 
states’ objectives and implementation of the waiting periods.50 
Most states that employed  residency requirements and  similar strategies 
did so under the guise of preserving their welfare resources for residents of the 
state.51 The state of Connecticut argued in Shapiro that the statutory residency 
requirement was necessary “to protect its fisc[al budget] by discouraging entry 
to  those who come needing relief.”52 In response to  the state’s arguments,  the 
Supreme Court opined, 
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal 
integrity of its programs.  It may legitimately attempt to  limit its 
expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any 
Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 631­32. 
47. The Court stated: 
There is no dispute that the effect of the waiting­period requirement in each case 
is to create two classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each 
other except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year or more, 
and the second of residents who have resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. 
On the basis of this sole difference the first class is granted and the second class 
is denied welfare aid upon which may depend the ability of the families to obtain 
the very means to subsist ­ food, shelter, and other necessities of life. 
Id. at 627. 
48. Id. at 634 (emphasis omitted). 
49. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31, at 61; see also Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 627. 
The effect of [residency restrictions] is to create two classes of needy resident 
families indistinguishable from each other except that one is composed of 
residents who have resided a year or more, and the second of residents who have 
resided less than a year, in the jurisdiction. On the basis of this sole difference 
the first class is granted and the second class is denied welfare aid upon which 
may depend the ability of the families to obtain the very means to subsist—food, 
shelter, and other necessities of life. 
Id. 
50. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634. 
51. Id. at 623. 
52. Id. (quoting Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Supp. 331 (D. Conn. 1967)). 
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other program. But a State may not accomplish  such  a purpose by 
invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens.53 
The Supreme Court also held that it was unconstitutional to discriminate 
against eligible poor citizens who migrated to a state seeking welfare benefits 
and  additionally hinted  at an  affirmative duty for states to  redress economic 
inequalities.54 While Shapiro  did  not declare that welfare entitlement was a 
constitutional right or “fundamental interest” under Supreme Court case law, 
access to  welfare benefits eventually did  become a legal entitlement via 
Goldberg v.  Kelly,55 which  for a short time guaranteed some constitutional 
protection for welfare recipients.56 
The Equal Protection Clause has also been used in the welfare law arena 
to  invalidate a state’s acts of discrimination based on gender.57 In  state­based 
welfare legislation,  gender­based  discrimination  occurred  because the mother 
usually served as the sole economic provider (in contrast to the traditional male 
breadwinner model).58 Such  a model went beyond  the world  of welfare to 
reinforce various gendered  divisions of labor where,  for example,  men were 
given a higher wage (termed the family wage) with the presumption that “he” 
was supporting a family or where men were seen as more aggressive and hard 
working employees.59 This model never took into account the additional “home 
work” for women that affect the differential in male and female productivity in 
the workplace. 
Yet such gendered assumptions pervaded the distribution and management 
of welfare benefits as well. In Califano v. Westcott, the Supreme Court decided 
to  eliminate gender­based discrimination  in  an  effort to  equalize state 
protections between unemployed mothers and  fathers. 60 Aid  to Families with 
Dependent Children  –  Unemployed  Father (AFDC –  UF) was a federally 
sponsored  program that provided  welfare to  families with  an  unemployed 
father,  but denied  benefits for an  unemployed  mother.61 After recent 
unemployment,  two  families in  which  women  served  as the primary 
breadwinner applied  for and  were denied  AFDC­UF benefits because the 
husbands did not qualify as “unemployed” fathers under the Act.62 Both of the 
53. Id. at 633. 
54. Gunther, supra note 17, at 39. 
55. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). 
56. See Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261; Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634; King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 
309, 324­27 (1968). 
57. Califano v. Westcott, 443 U.S. 76, 85 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring). 
58. See Califano, 443 U.S. at 81­82; Karl E. Klare, Toward New Strategies for Low­
Wage Workers, 4 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 245, 261–62 (1995); Lucie E. White, Closing the Care 
Gap That Welfare Left Behind, 577 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 131, 134 (2001). 
59. White, supra note 58, at 134­35. 
60. Califano, 443 U.S. at 76. 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 607 (1935). 
62. Califano, 443 U.S. at 80­81. 
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applicants in Califano would have qualified for benefits if they were males.63 In 
this case,  the Supreme Court denounced  this discriminatory statute as a 
violation  of the equal protection  principles embedded  in  the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth  Amendment.64 The Commonwealth  of Massachusetts 
argued that the gender distinctions were important to deter fraud by two­parent 
families.65 The key language in this case turned on the Supreme Court’s belief 
that the Massachusetts’s statute was founded on  archaic principles,  which 
supported  “sexual stereotypes”66 and “presume[d] the father has the ‘primary 
responsibility to provide [for] a home and its essentials.’”67 The Supreme Court 
concluded, “legislation that rest[s] on such presumptions, without more, cannot 
survive [intermediate] scrutiny under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.”68 The objectives advanced by Massachusetts for gender­based 
distinctions were rejected  by the Supreme Court because they were not 
substantially related  to  any significant government objective.69 Therefore,  the 
Supreme Court ruled  that benefits under the AFDC­UF program must be 
available to unemployed mothers as well as unemployed fathers.70 
The Due Process Clauses of both  the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
are equally important to  a case analysis of welfare law and  policy and  are 
intrinsically connected to the Equal Protection Clause. The Due Process Clause 
not only provides protection  for substantive rights, but also  mandates 
procedural safeguards before the government can  restrict a citizen’s liberty, 
life, or property.71 Once a substantive right has been identified by the Supreme 
Court,  procedural due process dictates that appropriate precautions must be 
provided  before the government may act in  this constitutionally protected 
72 area. 
63. Id. 
64. Id. at 83­89. 
65. Id. at 83. 
66. Id. at 81, 89 (quoting Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 283 (1975)). 
67. Id. at 89 (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975)). 
68. Id. When the Supreme Court reviews cases using an intermediate level of scrutiny, 
the government must show that the challenged classification—here, gender—serves an 
important state interest and that the classification is substantially related to serving that 
interest. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
69. Califano, 443 U.S. at 88; see also Amy S. Cleghorn, Justice Harry A. Blackmun: A 
Retrospective Consideration of the Justice’s Role in the Emancipation of Women, 25 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1176, 1191­96 (1995). 
70. Califano, 443 U.S. at 89. 
71. See generally Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
72. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334­35 (1976). The Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Eldridge, identified three distinct factors which must be considered in order to 
determine whether “administrative procedures . . . are constitutionally sufficient.” Id. First, 
the court considers private interests that are affected by the government action. Id. at 335. 
Second, the court weighs the likelihood of an erroneous deprivation against the likelihood 
that the additional safeguard will be needed. Id. Finally, the court considers any 
government’s interest in curtailing fiscal and administrative burdens that additional 
procedural safeguards might impose. Id. 
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B.  Procedural Due Process 
In  the area of welfare law and  policy,  the Social Security Act of 1935 
(SSA) set up national standards for eligibility.73 However,  states could 
administer these standards in  the ways they deemed  appropriate.74 The 
ambiguity that existed  here partially stems from the original SSA’s lack  of 
clarity in defining welfare; is was either 1) a substantive right (which the poor 
could demand in times of need) and thus entitled to due process protection or 2) 
a privilege (which could be denied or restricted at the whim of the federal/state 
governments).  Ideally,  if welfare benefits were a substantive right, procedural 
due process required  that the recipient received,  at a bare minimum,  a “fair 
hearing” before she could be removed from the program.75 However, the reality 
was that under most circumstances,  procedural due process was not initiated 
when a welfare mother’s continued eligibility was subjectively and summarily 
evaluated.76 In fact, when it came to denying benefits to welfare mothers, most 
procedures put in place could hardly have been said  to  reach  the level of due 
process required by the Fourteenth Amendment. However,  the 1970 Supreme 
Court decision Goldberg v. Kelly changed this.77 
In Goldberg,  welfare mothers in  New York  challenged  the procedures 
used  to  terminate welfare benefits.78 Under New York policy,  a caseworker’s 
mere doubts as to a welfare recipient’s eligibility were sufficient to suspend or 
terminate the benefits, affording the recipient no safeguard against arbitrary and 
unjustified  denial of benefits.79 Upon  request,  a recipient could  review the 
caseworker’s official justifications in support of termination of welfare benefits 
and ask for a hearing to contest the allegations, but only after benefits had been 
discontinued.80 The Supreme Court addressed whether the Due Process Clause 
of the Fourteenth  Amendment required  that welfare mothers receive an 
73. 42 U.S.C.S. § 607 (1935). 
74. Califano, 443 U.S. at 79; see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316­17 (1968). 
75. Arlo Chase, Maintaining Procedural Protections for Welfare Recipients: Defining 
Property for the Due Process Clause, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 571, 572 (1997). 
76. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution guarantee 
each citizen the right to Due Process of law. This legal concept has been used to restrict or 
limit the federal and state governments from enacting laws or conducting legal proceedings 
which deprive citizens of fundamental fairness, justice and liberty. At a bare minimum, a 
person must be given notice of proceedings and the opportunity to be heard. Chase, supra 
note 75, at 571­72; Stephen N. Subrin & A. Richard Dykstra, Notice and the Right to be 
Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.­C.L. L. REV. 449, 451­52 (1974). 
77. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 258­59 (1970). For an examination of the U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions defining the scope of the government's ability to terminate public 
benefits, see Jim Moye, Can’t Stop the Hustle: The Department of Housing and Urban 
Development’s “One Strike” Eviction Policy Fails to Get Drugs Out of America’s Projects, 
23 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 275, 282­83 (2003). 
78. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 256­57. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. at 259, see also Risa E. Kaufman, Bridging the Federalism Gap: Procedural 
Due Process and Race Discrimination in a Devolved Welfare System, 3 HASTINGS RACE & 
POVERTY L.J. 1, 16­18 (2005). 
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evidentiary hearing  before benefits were terminated,  providing  for the 
continuation of benefits pending resolution of eligibility concerns.81 In order to 
answer this question, the Supreme Court needed to determine whether welfare 
was “more like ‘property’ [or more like] a ‘gratuity.’”82 If welfare was 
considered property, the Constitution required that the government provide due 
process of law before the property could  be taken.83 Prior to  the decision  in 
Goldberg,  welfare benefits had  been  considered  a privilege.84 The Supreme 
Court declared earlier in Board of Regents v. Roth: 
[T]he requirements of procedural Due Process apply only to  the 
deprivation  of interests encompassed  by the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s protection  of liberty and  property.  When  protected 
interests are implicated,  the right to  some kind  of prior hearing  is 
paramount.  But the range of interests protected  by procedural Due 
Process is not infinite.85 
Therefore, procedural protections were only required when an analysis of 
“whether the nature of the interest is one within  the contemplation  of the 
‘liberty or property’ language of the Fourteenth Amendment” had been shown 
to be violated.86 In an astonishing blow to conservative welfare reformists, the 
Burger Court 87 ruled: 
The constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument that 
public assistance benefits are a ‘privilege’ and not a ‘right.’ . . . The 
extent to which procedural due process must be afforded the recipient 
is influenced by the extent to which he may be ‘condemned to suffer 
grievous loss, . . . and depends upon whether the recipient’s interest 
in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in summary 
adjudication. . . . For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means 
to  obtain  essential food,  clothing, housing,  and  medical care.  .  . . 
Thus the crucial factor in  this context .  .  . is that termination of aid 
pending  resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an 
81. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 261. 
82. Id. at 262, 262 n.8. The Court stated in its opinion that “[s]uch benefits are a matter 
of statutory entitlement for persons qualified to receive them. Their termination involves 
state action that adjudicates important rights.” Id. at 262 (footnote omitted). This proposition 
established the basis for the Court’s reference to welfare benefits as property in footnote 
eight of the decision: “It may be realistic today to regard welfare entitlements as more like 
‘property’ than a ‘gratuity.’ Much of the existing wealth in this country takes the form of 
rights that do not fall within traditional common­law concepts of property.” Id. at 262 n.8. 
83. Steven J. Eagle, Substantive Due Process and Regulatory Takings: A Reappraisal, 
51 ALA. L. REV. 977, 979­80 (2000). 
84. MARK V. TUSHNET, RED, WHITE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 214 (1988). 
85. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569­70 (1972). 
86. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1982). 
87. It is important to note that Chief Justice Burger dissented from this ruling. 
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eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. 
Since he lacks independent resources, his situation  becomes 
immediately desperate.88 
The Supreme Court declared that the entitlement to receive welfare was a 
property right and  as such, meaningful procedural safeguards consistent with 
the Fourteenth  Amendment must be implemented  prior to  taking  that 
property.89 While this decision  was a resounding  victory for welfare rights 
advocates and at least suggested that the liberal activism of the Warren Court 
might survive the transition to the Burger Court, it was not the final word. At 
this time,  the racial composition  of those benefiting  from welfare was 
increasingly African­American,  and  social welfare became even  more 
intimately tied  to  public metaphors of behavioral laziness and  promiscuity, 
which coincided with a moment of national fiscal insecurity.90 In addition, as 
legal scholar Martha Davis noted, many of the dissenting justices in Goldberg 
also refused at that time to declare welfare a fundamental right.91 Moreover, the 
Supreme Court’s description  of welfare as “more like ‘property’ than  a 
‘gratuity’”92 also provides evidence of the Supreme Court’s ambiguous stance 
on welfare as a property right. The vague language of “more like” left the door 
open to revisit the issue of welfare entitlement. 
C.  Equal Protection and Special Class Protection 
As early as the 1970s, legislation and the rights of the poor in particular, 
were vulnerable to the rising hegemony of the “moral majority” which argued 
that entitlement to basic rights should be predicated on behavioral prescriptions 
unrelated to actual need.93 The changing public sentiment translated into denial 
of access to  welfare benefits cloaked  in  arguments about greater deference 
toward  state’s rights.  It was hardly surprising  to  see the welfare recipients94 
challenge the family cap law95 in  1970. Equally not surprising  the Supreme 
Court declined  to  hold  in  Dandridge v.  Williams that welfare was a 
88. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262­64 (1970). 
89. Id. at 262 n.8; Handler, supra note 24, at 899. But see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 331­32 (1976) (restricting the right to a pre­termination hearing in welfare benefits 
cases under Goldberg's due process analysis). 
90. See generally HANCOCK, supra note 4; HERBERT J. GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE 
POOR: THE UNDERCLASS AND ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1996); THE UNDERCLASS DEBATE 
(Michael B. Katz ed., 1993); MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE UNDESERVING POOR (1990). 
91. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 102­18. For a discussion of welfare benefits and 
procedural due process in Goldberg, see Blasingame, supra note 34, at 349­53. 
92. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262 n.8. 
93. See generally MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POLITICS 
IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2007); LISA MCGIRR, SUBURBAN WARRIORS: THE ORIGINS OF THE 
NEW AMERICAN RIGHT (2002) 
94. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
95. Family cap legislation allows a state to set a maximum amount of cash assistance 
per family regardless of established need. Id. at 473. 
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fundamental right and  therefore welfare recipients were not a suspect class 
entitled to special constitutional protection.96 
In Dandridge, the state of Maryland provided welfare benefits for families 
based upon  calculating  their “standard of financial need.”97 If a family had  a 
“standard of financial need” which was greater than $250 per month, the state 
imposed a limit on  the total amount that family could  receive from AFDC. 98 
The “family cap” rule was used to discourage mothers from continuing to have 
children  supported  by welfare.99 Plaintiffs Linda Williams and  Junius Gary 
each  had  eight children  and were financially destitute.100 If each member of 
their respective families were counted individually their “standard of financial 
need” would  range from $296.00­$331.00  per month.101 However,  under 
Maryland’s family cap rule both  families were only eligible for $250.00  per 
month.102 In  this case,  the welfare recipients charged  that the maximum grant 
regulation  violated  the Equal Protection  Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.103 In  this ruling,  the Supreme Court appeared  to compromise on 
its previous inflexibility about welfare being an entitlement104 (via cooperative 
federalism) and  ruled  that the “family cap” law,  although discriminatory,  did 
not violate the Equal Protection  Clause and was permissible social and 
economic legislation.105 The Supreme Court reasoned: “[T]he Constitution does 
not empower this court to second­guess state officials charged with the difficult 
responsibility of allocating  limited public welfare funds among  the myriad of 
potential recipients.”106 The plaintiffs in Dandridge argued that the family cap 
legislation discriminated against a suspect class, and relying on the precedent of 
Goldberg, argued  that caps to  welfare benefits violated  a fundamental 
constitutionally protected  right.107 However,  the Supreme Court did  not 
recognize such claims and, therefore, declined to review Maryland’s maximum 
grant regulation under a strict scrutiny standard.108 The implication of lessening 
the standard of judicial review was to uphold any rationale articulated by the 
state that justified the imposition of family caps. 
The above ruling demonstrates how the state’s welfare policy legislated a 
bias for smaller families, yet the Supreme Court nonetheless upheld the statute. 
96. Id. at 485­86. 
97. Id. at 473. 
98. Id. In the city of Baltimore the maximum grant was $250, while outside of the city 
of Baltimore the maximum grant was $240.00. Williams v. Dandridge, 297 F. Supp. 450, 
453 (1968), rev’d, 397 U.S. 471 (1970). 
99. Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 477. 
100. Id. at 490. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. at 473. 
104. Id. at 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
105. Id. at 484­86. 
106. Id. at 503. 
107. Id. at 519­23 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
108. Id. at 486. 
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While the Constitution does not require that each citizen be treated identically 
to  satisfy the Equal Protection Clause,  the level of judicial scrutiny will vary 
based  on  whether a right is considered  fundamental or a social group is a 
suspect class (such  as race).109 However,  it is extremely difficult for a social 
group to be identified by the Supreme Court as a suspect class. Consider the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Harris v. McRae, 110 where the Hyde Amendment 
was at issue.111 Under the Hyde Amendment,  state Medicaid  programs could 
not use federal funds to  pay for abortions for indigent women,  unless the 
mother’s life was in danger or the pregnancy was the result of rape or incest.112 
Cora McRae,  whose situation  did  not fit into  either of the exceptions 
authorizing Medicaid  coverage, wanted  to  terminate her pregnancy.  She was 
pregnant,  in her first trimester,  and  receiving welfare and Medicaid from the 
state of New York.113 Ms. McRae argued that the Hyde Amendment denied her 
equal protection  under the law because it refused  to  fund  abortions to  those 
who were eligible for Medicaid, while permitting Medicaid to cover the costs 
associated with childbirth.114 Since the Hyde Amendment only restricted access 
109. A suspect class is a group identified by their history of unequal treatment due to 
immutable characteristics that result in position of political powerlessness. See City of 
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
The general rule that legislation is presumed to be valid gives way when a 
statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin. These factors are so 
seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws 
grounded in such considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy,­­
a view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. 
For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon 
rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny and will 
be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state interest. 
Id. 
110. 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 
111. Id.; Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. No. 94­439, 209, 90 Stat. 1418 (1976); Larry P. 
Boyd, Comment, The Hyde Amendment: New Implications for Equal Protection Claims, 33 
BAYLOR L. REV. 295, 295 (1981). 
112. Harris, 448 U.S. at 303; see also Ken Agran, When Government Must Pay: 
Compensating Rights and the Constitution, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 120­22 (2005) 
(applying the theory of compensating rights to the abortion funding decisions in Maher v. 
Roe and Harris v. McRae requiring the government to compensate for the coercive pressure 
designed to persuade poor women to choose childbirth over abortion). 
113. Harris, 448 U.S. at 303. 
114. Id. McRae also argued that the Hyde Amendment violated 
(1) the right of a woman, implicit in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy, (2) the prohibition 
under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment against any ‘law 
respecting an establishment of religion,’ and (3) the right to freedom of religion 
protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. 
Id. at 311. 
The Supreme Court held: 
Although the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause affords protection 
against unwarranted government interference with freedom of choice in the 
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to  abortions for women who  relied on Medicaid, McRae wanted  the court to 
recognize that poor mothers as a class represented  a politically weak  social 
group which  had  suffered  prejudicial treatment due to  the immutable 
characteristic of poverty,  and  this justified  the designation  of a suspect class 
with  a higher standard of review.115 Under such  a heightened  review,  the 
validity of the statute depended  on  whether the Hyde Amendment could 
demonstrate that it furthered an essential government objective, was narrowly 
tailored  to  achieve such  objective, and  the means employed  were the least 
restrictive to  accomplish  the intent of the legislation.116 If,  however,  the 
Supreme Court determined  that poor mothers were not a group in  need  of 
special recognition  as a suspect class,  the validity of the Hyde Amendment 
would  be authorized  if it could  merely demonstrate that the enacted  statute 
reasonably and rationally furthered any legitimate state objective. 
In  this case,  the Supreme Court reiterated  that poverty is not a suspect 
classification. The Supreme Court reasoned: 
An  indigent woman  desiring  an  abortion  does not come within  the 
limited category of disadvantaged classes so recognized by our cases. 
Nor does the fact that the impact of the regulation  falls upon  those 
who  cannot pay lead  to  a different conclusion. In  a sense,  every 
denial of welfare to  an  indigent creates a wealth classification  as 
compared to nonindigents who are able to pay for the desired goods 
context of certain personal decisions, it does not confer an entitlement to such 
funds as may be necessary to realize all the advantages of that freedom. To hold 
otherwise would mark a drastic change in our understanding of the Constitution. 
. . . To translate the limitation on governmental power implicit in the Due 
Process Clause into an affirmative funding obligation would require Congress to 
subsidize the medically necessary abortion of an indigent woman even if 
Congress had not enacted a Medicaid program to subsidize other medically 
necessary services. Nothing in the Due Process Clause supports such an 
extraordinary result. Whether freedom of choice that is constitutionally protected 
warrants federal subsidization is a question for Congress to answer, not a matter 
of constitutional entitlement. Accordingly, we conclude that the Hyde 
Amendment does not impinge on the due process liberty recognized in [Roe v.] 
Wade. 
Id. at 317­18. 
115. Id. at 301­303. Although the District Court concluded that the Hyde Amendment 
discriminated against teenage mothers who were a suspect class, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the Hyde Amendment did not single out recipients based on age and that 
regardless of age, funding for abortions would only be allowed in cases of medical necessity, 
rape or incest. Therefore, in order to warrant judicial review under strict scrutiny, McRae 
would be required “to prove that Congress ‘selected or reaffirmed a particular course of 
action at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.’” Id. at 323 (quoting Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 
(1979)). 
116. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
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or services. But this Court has never held that financial need alone 
identifies a suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis.117 
The Hyde Amendment did  discriminate by distinguishing  levels of 
benefits between  two  classes of poor mothers.118 However,  under the lowest 
level of judicial review, the Supreme Court concluded that the means employed 
(denying funds to pay for abortions for Medicaid recipients) was rationally and 
reasonably related to meet the state’s legitimate interest.119 The Supreme Court 
denied welfare recipients access to  financially supported  abortions (even 
though  the state paid  for expenses relating  to  childbirth) holding  that “[a]n 
indigent woman  who  desires an  abortion  suffers no  disadvantage as a 
consequence of [a state’s] decision to fund childbirth.”120 
The Supreme Court added  that the Constitution  or any case interpreting 
constitutional rights (i.e., Roe v.  Wade) did  not require constitutional 
entitlement to  financial resources,  especially if the barrier (to  exercise the 
constitutional right) was not one “of its own creation.”121 While the Supreme 
Court did  recognize the fundamental right to  choose to  have a child, McRae 
made it clear that there was no right to abortion at the government’s expense.122 
Within the emerging welfare policy, the choices that women could make with 
arguments, the decision by the Supreme Court was wholly inconsistent with  
their bodies were heavily circumscribed  by their access to  financial 
resources. 123 Moreover,  notwithstanding  inter­generational dependency 
124 
support of restrictive “family cap” legislation discussed earlier in Dandridge or 
even the dangerous and racially targeted eugenics arguments put forth to limit 
the number of illegitimate children decades earlier.125 
D.  Balance of Power Between the Judicial and Legislative Branches 
On  the surface,  the next two  cases, Saenz v. Roe and Legal Services v. 
Velazquez,  seem to  be decisions which  aggressively protected  the rights of 
welfare recipients and ruled  in  favor of their fundamental rights. Upon closer 
117. Harris, 448 U.S. at 323 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 470­71). 
118. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
119. Harris, 448 U.S. at 323. 
120. Id. at 314. 
121. Id. at 316. 
122. Id. at 307­08. 
123. See generally DOROTHY E. ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, 
REPRODUCTION AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (Vintage 1st ed. 1999). 
124. See, e.g., DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR 
NATIONAL ACTION (1965), reprinted in LEE RAINWATER & WILLIAM L. YANCEY, THE 
MOYNIHAN REPORT AND THE POLITICS OF CONTROVERSY 75 (1967). 
125. Lisa Powell, Note, Eugenics and Equality: Does the Constitution Allow Policies 
Designed To Discourage Reproduction Among Disfavored Groups?, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y 
REV. 481, 502­07 (2002); Nicole Huberfeld, Recent Development, Three Generations of 
Welfare Mothers Are Enough: A Disturbing Return to Eugenics in the Recent “Workfare” 
Law, 9 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 98, 128 ( 1998). 
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examination,  however,  it is clear that these cases were actually struggles for 
power between the Supreme Court and Congress, where welfare recipients 
became unintended beneficiaries. Here it appears that the main goal was not to 
benefit welfare recipients but to  maintain checks and  balances between  the 
legislative and judicial branches of government. 
A perfect example of this power struggle is Saenz v. Roe,126 a case which 
came on  the heels of the Personal Responsibility and  Work  Opportunity 
Reconciliation  Act of 1996 (PRWORA) and  the welfare reform agenda.127 
Thirty years prior to  this case,  in  Shapiro,128 the Supreme Court ruled  that 
residency restrictions under AFDC violated  the fundamental right to  travel.129 
In  order to  comply with  Shapiro,  most states eliminated  or altered the time 
period that indigent mothers had to wait in order to receive benefits.130 Unlike 
the residency requirement in  Shapiro—where the state denied  benefits to 
eligible new residents unless they resided in the state for one year—California 
established a residency policy which created a sliding scale for benefits based 
on  the time a family had  lived  in  the state.131 In  an  effort to  escape abusive 
domestic relationships,  the three women  in  Saenz v. Roe case moved  to 
California.132 Once in California they applied for AFDC and were informed that 
under California law if welfare benefits in  California exceeded  those in  the 
prior state of residence, the recipients would receive a reduced amount for one 
year. 133 California argued unsuccessfully that unlike Shapiro the welfare policy 
here did not impose on the fundamental right to travel because individuals were 
not denied  access to  welfare benefits.134 Further,  financial restraint justified 
reducing welfare benefits.135 And last, under the new welfare reform legislation 
Congress had granted the state the authority to set the residency requirement.136 
126. 526 U.S. 489 (1999). 
127. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1305 (2000). 
128. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
129. Id. at 638. 
130. See A.P. van der Mei, supra note 37, at 821; Wisconsin had a sixty day waiting 
period. Id. at 821 (citing WIS. STAT. § 49.19(11m) (1992)). Minnesota reduced benefits of 
those who resided less than six months. Id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 256D.065 (1991)). In 
California benefits could not exceed those obtain in the prior state of residence. Id. (citing 
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 11450.03 (1994)). 
131. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. For background and analysis of the implications of the 
court decision in this case, see Erica K. Nelson, Unanswered Questions: The Implications of 
Saenz v. Roe for Durational Residency Requirements, 49 KAN. L. REV. 193 (2000) and Dan 
Wolff, Right Road, Wrong Vehicle?: Rethinking Thirty Years of Right to Travel Doctrine: 
Saenz v. Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 25 DAYTON L. REV. 307 (2000). 
132. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 493. 
133. Id. at 494. 
134. Id. at 500. 
135. Id. at 497. 
136. 42 U.S.C. § 604(c) (1994). 
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PRWORA had  in  fact explicitly authorized  states to  limit welfare benefits to 
families who had resided in the state for less than one year.137 
Re­affirming  the “principles” established  in Shapiro, the Supreme Court 
ruled  that the residency restriction  in  California was unconstitutional and 
violated  the fundamental and  constitutional right to  travel.138 Supreme Court 
explained that: 
[T]he right to travel . . . embraces at least three different components. 
It protects the right of a citizen  of one State to  enter and  to  leave 
another State, the right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather than 
an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the second State and, 
for those travelers who elect to become permanent residents, the right 
to be treated like other citizens of that State.139 
While the Supreme Court acknowledged that California’s welfare policy 
did  not impact a person’s freedom of movement,  it found  that California’s 
policy violated the right of new residents to be treated as equal citizens of the 
state.140 Therefore, “[w]hat is at issue in this case, . . . [is] the right of the newly 
arrived citizen to the same privileges and immunities enjoyed by other citizens 
of the same State.”141 The Supreme Court also warned  that under the laws of 
the country,  it is the citizens who make up the citizenry of a state and not the 
states who choose its citizens.142 While great deference was given to state laws, 
these laws must also yield to the Constitution.143 In its concluding remarks the 
Supreme Court noted that: 
Citizens of the United States, whether rich or poor, have the right to 
choose to be citizens “of the state wherein they reside.” The States, 
however,  do  not have any right to  select their citizens.  The 
Fourteenth Amendment,  like the Constitution  itself, was,  as Justice 
Cardozo  put it,  “framed  upon  the theory that the peoples of the 
137. Id. 
138. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 499. 
139. Id. at 500. 
140. Id. at 502. 
141. Id. For scholarly debates on the Supreme Court decision in Saenz v. Roe, see Tim 
A. Lemper, Recent Case, The Promise and Perils of “Privileges or Immunities”: Saenz v. 
Roe, 119 S. Ct. 1518 (1999), 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 295 (1999); Kevin 
Maher, Comment, Like a Phoenix from the Ashes: Saenz v. Roe, The Right to Travel, and 
the Resurrection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 
TEX. TECH L. REV. 105 (2001); Bradley A. Meyer, Case Comment, Constitutional Law — 
Right to Travel: The United States Supreme Court Invalidates a Statute Requiring Welfare 
Recipients to Reside in a State For One Year Before Receiving Full Benefits Saenz v. Roe, 
526 U.S. 489 (1999), 76 N. DAK. L. REV. 427 (2000). 
142. Saenz, 526 U.S. at 511 (quoting Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seeling, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 
523 (1935)). 
143. Id. 
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several states must sink  or swim together,  and  that in  the long  run 
prosperity and salvation are in union and not division.”144 
The Supreme Court further noted that while preserving state resources is a 
justifiable goal,  California can  not legitimately accomplish  that goal by 
discriminating  between  citizens.145 The Supreme Court concluded  the 
following: 
[T]he question is not whether such saving is a legitimate purpose but 
whether the State may accomplish  that end  by the discriminatory 
means it has chosen.  . .  . But our negative answer to  the question 
does not rest on  the weakness of the State’s purported  fiscal 
justification.  It rests on  the fact that the Citizenship Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment expressly equates citizenship with residence: 
“That Clause does not provide for, and does not allow for, degrees of 
citizenship based on length of residence.”146 
The Supreme Court admonished  that even  if Congress had  authorized 
California to impose residency restrictions: 
[Congressional] legislative powers are however limited not only by 
the scope of the Framer’s affirmative delegation,  but also  by the 
principle “that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other 
specific provisions of the constitution.” .  .  . Congress has no 
affirmative power to  authorize the states to  violate the Fourteenth 
Amendment and is implicitly prohibited from passing legislation that 
purports to validate any such violation.147 
Essentially,  this passage was one of the Supreme Court’s clearest 
articulations of the limited powers of Congress. Here the Supreme Court stated 
that any attempt by Congress to allow states to set residency restrictions was in 
violation of the Constitution.148 The Supreme Court’s reading of the boundaries 
of the Constitution  continually served  as a powerful force in  restricting  the 
reach of Congressional decision­making in welfare policymaking. 
Legal Services v. Velazquez further crystallized how the struggle between 
Congress and  the Supreme Court unintentionally encouraged  the Supreme 
Court to argue that welfare rights were a fundamental right. The Legal Service 
Corporation (LSC), which was created by the Legal Service Corporation Act, 
144. Id. 
145. Id. at 506 (quoting Zoble v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 69 (1982)). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 508 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968)). 
148. Id. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (holding that 
“Congress is without power to enlist state cooperation in a joint federal­state program by 
legislation which authorizes the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”) (citing 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, n.10 (1966)). 
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provided funding to organizations that assisted lower income citizens with legal 
matters unrelated  to criminal law.149 In 1996  the Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations Act prohibited funds granted through the LSC 
to  be used  by litigants for purposes of “amending  or otherwise challenging 
existing  [welfare] law in  effect on  the date of the initiation  of the 
representation.”150 In Legal Services, the LSC argued  that this provision was 
invalid because the restriction denied welfare mothers the right to  counsel in 
order to object to unconstitutional or conflicting welfare laws and policies.151 
The Supreme Court held  that it was unconstitutional for Congress to 
provide funds for legal counsel to welfare mothers on the condition that those 
funds were not used  to  challenge the authority of Congressional welfare 
policy.152 Further,  the Supreme Court found  that it was impermissible for 
Congress to  assume the traditional role of review afforded  to  the judicial 
branch.153 Additionally, the Supreme Court noted that such a statute interfered 
with  the “‘unfettered  interchange of ideas [used] for the bringing  about of 
political and social changes desired by the people’” and therefore violated the 
fundamental rights of the First Amendment.154 The Supreme Court continued: 
Interpretation of the law and the Constitution is the primary mission 
of the judiciary when  it acts within  the sphere of its authority to 
resolve a case or controversy . .  .  . “It is emphatically the province 
and  the duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.” An 
informed, independent judiciary presumes an informed,  independent 
bar. Under § 504(a)(16), however, cases would be presented by LSC 
attorneys who  could  not advise the courts of serious questions of 
statutory validity.  . .  . By seeking to prohibit the analysis of certain 
legal issues and to truncate presentation to the courts, the enactment 
under review prohibits speech  and expression upon  which  courts 
must depend for the proper exercise of the judicial power. Congress 
cannot wrest the law from the Constitution which is its source .  . .  . 
149. 42 U.S.C. § 2996 (1974). 
150. Id. 
151. Legal Services v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001); see also Rust v. Sullivan, 
500 U.S. 173, 173 (1991) (upholding Section 1008 of the Public Health Service Act which 
precluded federal funds from being used to provide “counseling concerning, referrals for, 
and activities advocating abortion as a method of family planning, and require such projects 
to maintain an objective integrity and independence from the prohibited abortion activities 
by the use of separate facilities, personnel, and accounting records.”); Arthur N. Eisenberg, 
The Brooklyn Museum Controversy and the Issue of Government­Funded Expression, 66 
BROOK. L. REV. 275 (2000) (discussing government funded expression and first amendment 
principles). 
152. Velazquez, 531 U.S. at 545­46. 
153. Id. 
154. Id at 548 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). 
                 
             
   
                 
             
                       
                 
               
       
                 
                     
                 
                 
               
             
               
                   
 
                 
             
                   
               
             
                 
 
   
                       
                   
             
                   
         
           




           
 
                               
 
                     
                     
                             
                           
 
                     
         
22 WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY [Vol. 23:1 
The restriction  imposed  by the statute here threatens severe 
impairment of the judicial function.155 
While Legal Services could  be viewed  as another victory for welfare 
mothers,  the Supreme Court’s opinion  and  strong  dissent by Justice Scalia 
made it clear that welfare mothers had merely reaped the benefits of this more 
general debate over Congressional authority in a moment heavily governed by 
(when  it came to  the poor) a rising  fiscal conservatism and  personal 
responsibility. Consider, for example, Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion where 
he argued that an indigent welfare mother would not be deterred from bringing 
a lawsuit simply because she cannot be represented  by the LSC,  since the 
indigent welfare mother would simply have to hire a lawyer who did not work 
for LSC.156 And even if it did mean fewer statutory challenges to welfare laws, 
“so  what? .  .  .  [T]he welfare recipient [is] in  no  worse condition  than  she 
would have been in had the LSC program never been enacted.”157 Theoretically 
this was true,  since everyone had  access to  the Supreme Court.  But,  in  the 
context of this situation  and  the reality of poverty,  LSC would  be the only 
feasible option for these welfare recipients. 
Despite the Supreme Court’s signature endorsement here of procedural 
due process, equal protection under the law, and fundamental rights,  there are 
still other cases decided  on welfare law which  signal the Supreme Court’s 
retreat from ruling  in  a manner which  afforded  welfare recipients a more 
complete granting  of constitutional rights.158 These legal cases would 
reorganize the working power relationship between the state and  federal 
government. 
II. FEDERALISM 
One of the key features of the Constitution is its focus on federalism (or, 
its explanation  of what role and  exactly how much authority the federal 
government could  take from the states).159 Scholar Andrew McLaughlin 
defined  federalism as a “system of political order in  which  powers of the 
government are separated  and  distinguished  and  in  which  these powers are 
distributed among governments, each government having its quota of authority 
and each its distinct sphere of activity.”160 Within the federalist relationship, the 
155. Id. at 545­46. 
156. Id. at 556­57 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
157. Id. 
158. See, e.g., Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 338 (1975); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 
(1968). 
159. See WAYNE D. MOORE, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 
(1996); LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, AMERICAN LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984); Richard E. Levy 
& Stephen R. McAllister, Federalism in the 21st Century: Defining the Roles of the National 
and State Governments in the American Federal System, 45 KAN. L. REV. 971, 971­72 
(1997). 
160. Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American Federalism, 12 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 215, 215 (1918). 
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courts serve a regulating  function,  using  the Constitution  to  mediate the 
relationship between state and national governments.161 
However,  the question still remains as to what specific role the Supreme 
Court has in this complex matrix of mediation. In the case of welfare law, the 
Supreme Court was the instrument used  by working  poor and  specifically 
working  class Black women  to  challenge acts of discrimination  implemented 
through  state policies.162 When  it came to  distribution of welfare funds,  state 
and  local government officials were paternalistically involved  in  the lives of 
low­income Black mothers.163 As in larger Civil Rights struggles,  the call for 
“states’ rights” became the perfect foil to implement and enforce “separate and 
unequal” under the law.164 In  most cases,  without the intervention  of the 
Supreme Court Black  mothers were “at greater risk  of being  discriminated 
against because of personal and institutional race bias.”165 
In the context of welfare and federalism, it was also clear that the Supreme 
Court was limited  in  what could  be offered  by its legal decisions.  Scholar 
Polyvois G.  Polyviou  notes,  “[t]he Constitution  does not provide judicial 
remedies for every social and economic ill.”166 However, the Supreme Court’s 
role did  regulate “appropriate” levels of power between  state and federal 
governments.  Under different theories of federalism, the federal or state 
government may hold  stronger control over issues relating  to,  for example, 
welfare, health, and/or education.167 Therefore, decisions by the Supreme Court 
fluctuate between  ideas of “cooperative federalism” (preference for a 
decentralized structure of government where state and federal institutions work 
together to  regulate policy implementation)168 to  ideas of “new federalism” 
(where federal government takes a hands off approach on matters relating  to 
161. Richard B. Stewart, Federalism: Allocating Responsibility Between the Federal 
and State Courts, 19 GA. L. REV. 917, 918 (1985). 
162. Levy & McAllister, supra note 159. 
163. See DEBORAH WARD, THE WHITE WELFARE STATE: THE RACIALIZATION OF U.S. 
WELFARE POLICY (2005); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM 
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31. 
164. KEVIN KRUSE, WHITE FLIGHT: ATLANTA AND THE MAKING OF MODERN 
CONSERVATISM (2007). 
165. Risa E. Kaufman, supra note 80, at 15. 
166. POLYVIOS G. POLYVIOU, THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS 217 (1980). 
167. For a discussion of cooperative federalism, see Philip J. Weiser, Cooperative 
Federalism and Its Challenges, 2003 MICH. ST. DCL L. REV. 727, 729 (2003). 
A critical advantage of a cooperative federalism approach is that it sets forth a 
basic federal framework while allowing states to experiment within certain 
contours . . . respecting long­standing state interests and autonomy . . . 
facilitating local participation and greater accountability for public policies . . . 
allowing for local experimentation and interstate competition . . . and . . . relying 
on the economy of local agencies (rather than creating or expanding a national 
bureaucracy.) 
Id. 
168. Weiser, supra note 167, at 730­31. 
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state governance).169 This section will examine some Supreme Court decisions 
through the lens of federalism and see how changes in  the inquiry of federal­
state relationships affected welfare law decisions. 
The “War on Poverty,” officially waged in August 1964, was an ambitious 
legislative effort to  address the problem of a persistent racialized  poverty in 
America.170 Over the next decade, the federal government (in conjunction with 
state and local governments, non­profits, and grassroots organizations) created 
a new institutional infrastructure for antipoverty and  civil rights action.171 
Characterized  alternatively as times of consensus and  controversy,172 this 
antipoverty and civil rights agenda highlighted growing ideological and racial 
tensions in American  society. Congress felt discomfort in  the realization  that 
after all their declarations of equality,  it was evident that some citizens were 
“more equal” than others.173 
While there was national consensus building around the idea that poverty 
was a problem in need of eradication or at least deserving of vigorous attention, 
there was less agreement in Congress as to the cause and subsequent solution to 
the problem.174 The increase in welfare rolls after the initiation of the War on 
Poverty agenda encouraged many states to  experiment with  regulations to 
control the growth  and  cost of their welfare programs. 175 Many of these 
restrictive measures— declaring a home “unsuitable” in order to deny benefits, 
denying benefits under the “man­in­the­house” rule, and establishing residency 
requirements—pre­dated the War on Poverty agenda and were heavily enforced 
against poor Black mothers in particular.176 Some state legislation declared that, 
for example, men who had sexual relationships with mothers on welfare were 
financially responsible for them and their children.177 These “substitute parent” 
regulations removed  the mother from the roll regardless of whether the 
“boyfriend” contributed to that family’s income.178 The following cases discuss 
169. Irving L. Horowitz, From the New Deal to the New Federalism: Presidential 
Ideology in the U.S. from 1932 to 1982, 42 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 129, 131 (1983). 
170. ALLEN J. MATUSOW, THE UNRAVELING OF AMERICA: A HISTORY OF LIBERALISM IN 
THE 1960S 116­24 (1984). 
171. FELICIA KORNBLUH, THE BATTLE FOR WELFARE RIGHTS: POLITICS AND POVERTY 
IN MODERN AMERICA (2007); PREMILLA NADASEN, WELFARE WARRIORS: THE WELFARE 
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES xiv­xvi (2004). 
172. KORNBLUSH, supra note 171; NADASEN, supra note 171. 
173. ALICE O’CONNOR, POVERTY KNOWLEDGE: SOCIAL SCIENCE, SOCIAL POLICY, AND 
THE POOR IN TWENTIETH­CENTURY U.S. HISTORY (2001). 
174. Id. 
175. NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31, at 59. 
176. GERTRUDE SCHAFFNER GOLDBERG & SHEILA D. COLLINS, WASHINGTON’S NEW 
POOR LAW: WELFARE REFORM AND THE ROADS NOT TAKEN, 1935 TO THE PRESENT 20 (2000). 
Goldberg and Collins argued that most restrictions, such as the “suitable home” requirements 
were attempts by states to deny aid to poor Black women and children. Id. 
177. Nineteen states and the District of Columbia had man­in­the­house rules. King v. 
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 337 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
178. Id. at 314; NEUBECK & CAZENAVE, supra note 31, at 60. 
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these types of regulations and  reveal that the Supreme Court articulated  and 
maintained a dominant federal government presence over welfare legislation 
King v.  Smith challenged  the constitutionality of state restrictions that 
deviated from the federal mandates outlined in the SSA.179 As one of the first 
cases to  reach  the Supreme Court,  King came through  the federal courts 
because state courts were hostile to the interest of the poor and especially Black 
people,  as the primary beneficiaries of the increased welfare rolls during  the 
late 1960s.180 Mrs. Sylvester Smith, a Black mother of four children, received 
AFDC to supplement the sixteen to twenty dollars she earned weekly working 
as a waitress.181 Her welfare benefits were terminated  because it was alleged 
that “Mr. [Willie E.] Williams came to her home on weekends and had sexual 
relations with  her.”182 Based  upon  this description  of Mrs.  Smith  and  Mr. 
Williams’s relationship alone,  Mr. Williams was classified  as a “substituted 
father.”183 Alabama’s regulation  denied  benefits to  families who  had  a 
“substitute father.”184 
Alabama argued that its motivations for the “substitute father” rule were 
to preserve the spirit of morality and worthiness embodied  in  its welfare law 
provisions.185 Further,  Alabama stressed  that it was unfair to  allow sexually 
active,  unmarried  and  immoral mothers who  refused  to  marry to  receive 
benefits over those married  mothers in  the same economic situations.186 
Unimpressed  by this rationale,  the Supreme Court concluded  that Alabama’s 
standards of morality were clearly outdated  and  concluded  that “it is simply 
inconceivable .  .  .  that Alabama is free to  discourage immortality and 
illegitimacy by the device of absolute disqualification of needy children.”187 
In  a unanimous decision,  the Supreme Court relied  on  the doctrine of 
“cooperative federalism” to  knock down  the “substitute father” rule.188 Under 
179. King, 392 U.S. at 309. 
180. DAVIS, supra note 6, at 60. 
181. King, 392 U.S. at 315. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. Under substitute father provisions, otherwise eligible mothers were removed 
from the rolls if the social worker concluded that they were inappropriately associating with 
a man or if a man was found inside the recipient’s home. Such regulations would be 
enforced through frequent unannounced nighttime raids. See Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna 
to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. 
L. REV. 415, 423 n.51 (1999). 
184. King, 392 U.S. at 315. In 1964, Governor George Wallace approved the substitute 
father rule which removed over 14,000 Black children from the welfare rolls in Alabama. 
William E. Forbath, Not So Simple Justice: Frank Michelman on Social Rights, 39 TULSA L. 
REV. 597, 606 (2004). 
185. King, 392 U.S. at 320. 
186. Id. at 320­27. 
187. Id. at 325. “[S]ubsequent developments clearly establish that these state interests 
are not presently justifications for AFDC disqualification. Insofar as this or any similar 
regulation is based on the state’s asserted interest in discouraging illicit sexual behavior and 
illegitimacy, it plainly conflicts with federal law and policy.” Id. at 320. 
188. Id. at 316. 
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the doctrine of “cooperative federalism” states were free to  administer their 
respective AFDC programs to reflect whatever goals and philosophies needed 
to  assist and  serve the poor.189 However,  state programs were still bound  by 
federal­state financing  arrangements,  and  state standards had  to be consistent 
with the Constitution as well as federal regulations and statutes. The Supreme 
Court determined that Alabama’s definition of parent conflicted with the SSA, 
and  “any state law or regulation  inconsistent with  such  federal terms and 
conditions is to that extent invalid.”190 Therefore, in order to continue to receive 
money from the federal government to assist in financing its AFDC programs, 
the state could not impose a man­in­the­house rule.191 
The King case demonstrates a conceptual shift in Supreme Court welfare 
ideology toward  cooperative federalism,  where the federal government 
conditioned  funding  according  to  how state governments regulated  and 
legislated  their AFDC programs in  accordance with  federal (constitutional) 
concerns. Moreover, under this theory, the Supreme Court concluded that states 
had an obligation (if they accept federal funding) to furnish aid to all eligible 
poor. 192 King signaled  expanded  control of the federal government over state 
policies and practices. The King doctrine was also expanded to exclude a live­
in boyfriend193 as well as a roommate.194 
189. See id. The AFDC program is an example of cooperative federalism. See Alexia 
Pappas, Welfare Reform: Child Welfare or the Rhetoric of Responsibility, 45 DUKE L.J. 
1301, 1307 (1996); Stephen D. Sugarman, Welfare Reform and the Cooperative Federalism 
of America’s Public Income Transfer Programs, 14 YALE J. ON REG. 123, 124 (1996) 
(Symposium Issue). 
190. King, 392 U.S. at 333 n.34. 
191. Id. at 309. Justice Douglas argued that the case should have been decided on 
equal protection grounds because Alabama had the option to reject federal funding and 
continue imposing the man­in­the­house eligibility restriction. Id. at 320, 326­27, 332­33 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
192. Id. at 334. 
193. Id. at 335­36. In Lewis v. Martin decided two years after King, the Supreme Court 
ruled that California could not declare a non­adopting live­in boyfriend (who had no legal 
obligation to provide financial assistance to the dependent child) a breadwinner “. . . unless 
the bread is actually set on the table.” Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 559 (1970). The Lewis 
case can be distinguished from King in several respects. First, unlike in King, California did 
not remove the welfare mother from the welfare roll, but instead included the live­in 
boyfriend as a breadwinner and reduced the amount she would receive. Id. Second, the 
boyfriend in this case assumed the role of spouse or stepfather whereas the boyfriend in King 
did not. Id. The Supreme Court invalidated the California statute because it was in conflict 
with the United States Department of Health Education and Welfare (HEW) regulation. Id. 
Accordingly, it was impermissible for a state to use the income of a live­in boyfriend or a 
non­adopting stepfather in calculating the need of the child unless the live­in boyfriend had a 
legal obligation to provide such support. Id. at 557, 559­60. 
194. King, 392 U.S. at 335­36. Van Lare v. Hurley also addressed the issue of legal 
obligation in providing financial assistance for a needy child. Van Lare v. Hurley, 421 U.S. 
338, 346 (1975). In Van Lare, the Supreme Court invalidated New York’s statute that used 
the income generated from a roommate/lodger to be considered for determination of 
benefits. Id. Briefly, the Supreme Court reiterated that it was inconsistent with the SSA to 
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Under cooperative federalism,  the state and  federal governments jointly 
administered,  implemented, and  financed some areas of social welfare (i.e. 
AFDC, Medicaid, education). If the federal government provided grants to the 
state for a particular program, the state had considerable latitude in developing 
policies and regulations for such programs. However,  if the state’s statutes in 
relationship to  the granted  program were in  conflict with  the same federal 
statute, the Supreme Court could intervene.195 The Supreme Court invalidated a 
state statute if it failed to further the federal statute’s objective for the particular 
program. 196 In  this context,  the federal objective of the Social Security Act 
(Title IV) was to provide assistance to all eligible poor. 197 Two cases that are 
perfect examples of the Supreme Court’s preemptive powers and  exercise of 
cooperative federalism are Carleson v. Remillard198 and Townsend v. Swank.199 
In Carleson,  the Supreme Court preempted  a statute which was in  clear 
conflict with the SSA.200 Here, federal legislation required each state to provide 
aid  “with  reasonable promptness to  all eligible individuals.”201 Nancy 
Remillard had one child and her husband was deployed to fight in Vietnam.202 
The state of California denied  aid  because in  order to  be entitled  to  cash 
assistance the absence of a parent had to  be considered “continued absence,” 
and  under California regulation  “absence occasioned  by a father’s military 
duties can never be ‘continued.’”203 The state’s regulation defined “continued 
absence” in a narrow way that limited the conditions of eligibility.204 However, 
the Supreme Court read  the federal statute broadly and concluded that a state 
was forbidden  from denying  AFDC benefits to  a child  because the parent’s 
absence was due to  military service.205 In  fact,  Congress argued  that the 
use the income of a person who was not the natural or legally obligated supporter of a needy 
child as justification to reduce welfare benefits. Id. 
195. See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 506 (1999) (quoting Zoble v. Williams, 457 
U.S. 55, 69 (1982)). 
196. Id. 
197. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 480 (1970). 
198. 406 U.S. 598 (1972); see generally Larry Catá Backer, Poor Relief, Welfare 
Paralysis, and Assimilation, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 1 (1996) (examining constitutional cases 
under a theory of mobile immobility of poor relief systems). 
199. 404 U.S. 282 (1971). 
200. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a)(10), 602 (2000). 
201. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 600. 
202. Id. at 599. 
203. Remillard v. Carleson, 325 F. Supp. 1272, 1272­73 (N.D. Cal. 1971), aff’d, 406 
U.S. 598 (1972). 
204. Id. 
205. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 604. It is significant that the law was changed in 
amendments to the Social Security Act relating to the AFDC and ADC programs in 1982. 
Pub. L. No. 97­248, 96 Stat. 317 (1982) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 406(a)(1) 
(1982)). The amendment read that a parent whose absence is “occasioned solely by reason of 
the performance of active duty in a uniformed service of the United States is not considered 
absent from the home.” Id. After 1982, therefore, military parents were no longer eligible for 
AFDC. Id. 
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eligibility requirements of parental “continued  absence” included absence 
attributed to any reason.206 Unfortunately,  this decision made no provision for 
parents who  were “provisionally absent” due to  unemployment or simply 
because of poverty, but the Supreme Court did recognize in Townsend v. Swank 
that not only were absent parents with children eligible, but also families with 
children  under the age of twenty continuing  studies in  colleges and 
universities.207 
In Townsend, plaintiff Georgia Townsend was denied benefits because her 
child was enrolled in college.208 In the state of Illinois, mothers of poor children 
between  the ages of eighteen  and  twenty were eligible to  receive benefits so 
long  as that child  was enrolled  in  high  school.209 However,  if the child  was 
enrolled  in  college,  the mother was no  longer eligible for AFDC benefits.210 
Under SSA,  Townsend  would  have been eligible for benefits.211 In  order to 
disqualify Townsend from the state AFDC program, Illinois had the discretion 
to opt out of the federal AFDC program. Since Illinois did participate in AFDC 
it could set standards of eligibility to widen the requirements without breaching 
their obligation  under the federal­state financing  arrangement.212 If Illinois 
wanted  to  tighten  eligibility standards,  however,  they had  to  adhere to  the 
minimum parameters already established  by the SSA.213 Illinois argued  that 
Congress authorized such disparities in treatment among poor eligible children 
and  this restriction  was needed  in  order to  preserve their limited  welfare 
resources. 214 However,  the Supreme Court,  unmoved  by economic concerns, 
noted  that states may not pass laws which  “are inconsistent with  the [Social 
Security Act] and that welfare must be furnished ‘to all eligible individuals.’”215 
The Supreme Court also  found  no  support for Illinois’ argument that 
Congress allowed  states to  “discriminate between  these needy dependent 
206. Carleson, 406 U.S. at 601­02. HEW’s regulations state: 
Continued absence of the parent from the home constitutes the reason for 
deprivation of parental support or care when the parent is out of the home, the 
nature of the absence is such as either to interrupt or to terminate the parent's 
functioning as a provider of maintenance, physical care, or guidance for the 
child, and the known or indefinite duration of the absence precludes counting on 
the parent's performance of his function in planning for the present support or 
care of the child. If these conditions exist, the parent may be absent for any 
reason, and he may have left only recently or some time previously. 
Id. 
207. 404 U.S. 282, 286­88 (1971). 
208. Id. at 283­84. 
209. Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. In 1965 Congress amended the SSA which made eighteen to twenty­year­olds 
eligible for AFDC if they attended a high school, vocational school, college or university. 
H.R. 6675, 89th Cong. (1965) (enacted). 
212. Townsend, 404 U.S. at 285. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. at 291. 
215. Id. at 286 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 n.34). 
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children  solely upon  the basis of the type of school attended.”216 At most,  as 
Chief Justice Burger noted  in  the concurring  opinion,  states could  only 
discriminate among  classes of eligible poor children  if it elected  to  forego 
federal funding.217 The Supreme Court stated: 
[I]n  the absence of congressional authorization  for the exclusion 
clearly evidenced  from the Social Security Act or its legislative 
history, a state eligibility standard that excludes persons eligible for 
assistance under federal AFDC standards violates the Social Security 
Act and is therefore invalid under the Supremacy Clause.218 
Accordingly,  Illinois could not impose additional restrictive criteria 
beyond  those set forth  in  the SSA.219 Townsend is significant because the 
Supreme Court kept the door open for considering welfare as a legitimate claim 
even  if the case did  not establish  a constitutional right to  welfare.  Although 
Townsend demonstrated  how far federal authority could  reach  under 
cooperative federalism,  not all cases involving  cooperative federalism were 
decided against states’ rights. 
The 1971 Supreme Court decision of Wyman v. James fits the cooperative 
federalist frame220 and  yet embodies perhaps one of the most sweeping 
encroachments on welfare rights. Wyman authorized social workers to conduct 
“consent” home visits of a welfare recipient’s home to  ensure eligibility 
requirements were met with  threat of aid  suspension  in  the face of 
noncompliance.221 Barbara James,  a welfare recipient for two  years,  received 
notice that she had to submit to a home visit by a social worker.222 Ms. James 
refused to allow the social worker to visit her home, but was willing to provide 
any proof of eligibility required by the law.223 The social worker did not need 
any particular reason to perform the search which could be performed without a 
warrant.224 The Supreme Court first concluded that since no search had in fact 
occurred,  this case was not within  the purview of those rights considered 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.225 The court held: 
This natural and  quite proper protective attitude,  however,  is not a 
factor in this case, for the seemingly obvious and simple reason that 
we are not concerned  with any search  by the New York  Social 
216. Id. at 287. 
217. Id. at 292 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
218. Id. at 286. 
219. Id. 
220. 400 U.S. 309 (1971). 
221. Id. at 326. 
222. Id. at 314. 
223. Id. 
224. Id. at 317. 
225. Id. at 318. 
                 
           
               
             
 
 
                 
             
                     
                   
                 
                     
                 
                   
                   
           
             
 
         
                 
                 
         
                   
                   
                       
                 
 
           
               
                 
                         
                              
 
                           
                             
                     
         




                           
                         
     
             
                             
 
30 WISCONSIN JOURNAL OF LAW, GENDER & SOCIETY [Vol. 23:1 
Service agency in  the Fourth Amendment meaning of the term.  .  .  . 
[T]he visitation in itself is not forced or compelled . . . if consent to 
the visitation  is withheld, no visitation  takes place.  .  .  . There is no 
entry of the home and there is no search. 226 
In ruling as it did, the Supreme Court assumed that there was no coercion 
involved  in  the decision  to  grant or withhold  consent.227 The Supreme Court 
further noted that even if it had concluded that the search by a caseworker was 
akin to a search by a law enforcement official for a criminal investigation, the 
search  would  not be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.228 The 
Supreme Court decided that the privacy interest of the recipient affected by a 
search  is minimal and  that the visits were reasonable to  determine the 
recipient’s eligibility.229 The visits were not part of any criminal investigation, 
the recipient was not an  actual or suspected  perpetrator of a crime and 
caseworkers were not “uniformed  authorit[ies].”230 Therefore,  these searches 
were “reasonable administrative tool[s]” to  ensure compliance with  AFDC 
regulations.231 
The Wyman decision,  which  had negative Fourth  Amendment 
implications,  served  as evidence of the Supreme Court’s new resistance to 
defining welfare as a property right.232 The Supreme Court remarked, “one who 
dispenses purely private charity naturally has an interest in and expects to know 
how his charitable funds are utilized and put to work.”233 The Supreme Court’s 
support of states’ rights arguments within a federalist logic was striking in this 
case because it did not observe that the state had  exceeded its boundaries 
concluding that the state had not overreached in a way that generated conflict 
within the federal law or the Constitution. 
Between the decisions reached in King and Townsend, the Supreme Court 
had  defined  a system that allowed  the federal government flexibility in 
determining state AFDC regulations solely on the basis that they provided most 
of the money.234 This system did not allow states to create rules that were more 
226. Id. at 317­18; see also Erik G. Luna, Welfare Fraud and the Fourth Amendment, 
24 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1254­80 (1997) (discussing various types of searches that can be 
performed on a welfare recipient’s home without violating the Fourth Amendment). 
227. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 317. 
228. Id. at 318 (emphasis added). 
229. Id. at 318­19. 
230. Id. at 322­23. 
231. Id. at 326. 
232. For an alternative discussion of the Supreme Court theme in Wyman v. James, see 
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEO. L.J. 
1499, 1522­25 (1991). 
233. Wyman, 400 U.S. at 319 (emphasis added). 
234. Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282, 291 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 
(1968). 
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restrictive and  hence struck  down many state regulations.235 But because the 
Court also  recognized  at least the limited  validity of state regulations,  these 
cases helped  give rise to  a new Supreme Court interpretive variation  most 
generally understood  as “new federalism.”236 The rubric of “new federalism” 
institutionalized  deference to  the state by both  Congress and  the Supreme 
Court,  for legislating  in  areas that had  historically been  controlled  by the 
federal government.237 
New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino represents one 
of the clearest articulations of the Supreme Court’s move away from 
cooperative federalism and into  the domain  of new federalism and  a full 
endorsement of states’ rights.238 In Dublino, it was clear that the state and 
federal legislation were in conflict, but instead of invalidating the state statute, 
the Supreme Court found  that the Work  Incentive Program (WIN) did  not 
forbid the “Work Rules” enacted by the state of New York.239 
In  1971,  the state of New York  enacted  “Work  Rules.”240 Work  Rules 
required that all recipients who can work must “report every two weeks to pick 
up their assistance checks in person; to file every two weeks a certificate . .  . 
[stating  they could  not find] suitable employment; to report for requested 
employment interviews; to report to the public employment office the result of 
a referral for employment; and  not to  fail willfully to  report for suitable 
employment, when  available.”241 If a recipient failed to  perform these 
requirements under the work  rules, welfare benefits were discontinued.242 By 
contrast,  the federal government’s Work  Incentive Program (WIN) did  not 
require welfare recipient to  demonstrate an  effort to  seek  employment as a 
condition  for receiving  benefits.243 The plaintiffs, most of whom were Black 
mothers,  challenged  the validity of Work  Rules in light of the WIN 
legislation.244 The Supreme Court revitalized  states’ rights in  its decision and 
reiterated  the theory of “new federalism” for solving  conflicts over welfare 
policy legislation.245 While the New York  work  requirement was in  clear 
conflict with  the WIN legislation,  the Supreme Court found  persuasive the 
state’s argument that welfare recipients should demonstrate their efforts to find 
235. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 
618, 633 (1969); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 320­21 (1968). 
236. See Horowitz, supra note 169, at 131. 
237. 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
238. Id. at 412­13; see also Judith Olans Brown, Lucy A. Williams & Phyllis Tropper 
Baumann, The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women in Paid and Unpaid 
Labor, 6 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 457, 492 (1996). 
239. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 411­12. 
240. Id. at 405. 
241. Id. at 408­09. 
242. Id. at 409. 
243. Dublino v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 348 F. Supp. 290, 295 (W.D.N.Y. 
1972), rev’d, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
244. Id. 
245. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 413. 
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work and demonstrate a profile of employability; and concluded that the statute 
did  not present a real obstacle to  the goals and philosophies of the federal 
246 program. 
Thus,  despite the existence of the federal work  incentive scheme,  the 
Supreme Court ruled that there was no “clear manifestation” of any 
Congressional intent to  block  state policies that required  recipients to 
demonstrate efforts to work.247 Under new federalism, the Supreme Court was 
free to  interpret how federal statutes—particularly those that favored 
recipients—were implemented by the state. 
Jefferson  v.  Hackney serves as another example of the new federalist 
approach, where the Supreme Court decided  that the state of Texas had  the 
power to  distribute its welfare resources unevenly.248 The Texas Constitution 
provided  that the state could participate in  any federal welfare programs,  but 
could only allocate a maximum of $80,000 to fund the entire program.249 This 
included  funding  for AFDC, Old Age Assistance (OAA),250 Aid  to  the Blind 
(AB),251 and Aid for the Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD).252 In order 
to  efficiently use the funds,  Texas calculated  the financial need of each 
individual recipient who applied for the various programs.253 If the person was 
handicapped  and  eligible for a welfare program other than  AFDC,  that 
individual received  ninety­five to  one hundred  percent of the calculated 
financial need.254 However if the person was eligible for AFDC,  that person 
only received fifty percent of their calculated financial need.255 This resulted in 
a significant decrease in benefits paid  to  the predominately Black  AFDC 
program as compared  to  the predominately White OAA,  AB,  or APTD 
256 programs. 
In upholding this budgetary scheme, the Supreme Court confirmed, “there 
is no question  that states have considerable latitude in allocating  their AFDC 
resources,  since each  state is free to  set its own  standards of need  and  to 
determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes to  the 
246. Id.; see also Brown et al., supra note 238, at 491­95 (arguing that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dublino created legal doctrine which contributed to the oppression of 
women, particularly in the context of welfare and paid labor). 
247. N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 413 U.S. at 413, 414­15 (quoting Schwartz v. 
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 202­03 (1952). 
248. Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 541 (1972); see also Marion Buckley, 
Eliminating the Per­Child Allotment in the AFDC Program, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 169, 187 
(1994) (providing an overview of AFDC and discussing the effects of Supreme Court 
decisions on per­child allotment legislation). 
249. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537, 537 n.1. 
250. Grants to States of Old­Age Assistance for the Aged, 42 U.S.C. § 301 (2000). 
251. Grants to States for Aid to the Blind, 42 U.S.C. § 1201 (repealed 1974). 
252. Grants to States for Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled, 42 U.S.C. § 
1352 (1996); Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537 n.2. 
253. Jefferson, 406 U.S. at 537. 
254. Id. at 537, 537 n.3. 
255. Id. 
256. Id. 
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program.”257 This case demonstrated  a clear ideological shift that veered 
towards complete deference to “states’ rights” in ways that had direct and dire 
implications for specifically working­class Black women navigating welfare. 
Federalism continues to  be a central lens through which  current welfare 
cases are decided  by the Supreme Court.258 However, the emerging  new 
federalist approach  to welfare demonstrates the growing significance of fiscal 
concern  as a legitimate claim and  the rise of fiscal conservatism as a viable 
framework  for endorsing  a state’s rights argument in welfare law and  policy 
decisions. 
III. FISCAL CONSERVATISM 
Advocates of a fiscally conservative polity were generally critical of 
allocating  public funds to  poverty­related  social programs (as opposed  to tax 
subsidies for the wealthy or defense spending).259 Therefore,  the rationale of 
fiscal conservatism became a powerful interpretive framework  through which 
states adjusted welfare regulations to limit the welfare rolls.260 Supreme Court 
decisions were more directly shaped by economically conservative approaches 
for evaluating  the use value or even  cost­benefits of social programs for the 
poor, perhaps influenced by three other developments: a larger backlash against 
the perceived politics of the 1960s,  the ascendancy of centrist democratic and 
right wing  republican  governments,  and  a growth  in  national deficit.  When 
recipients and  their advocates turned  to  the Supreme Court to  challenge 
restrictive state welfare regulations, most states argued  that regulations were 
needed  to  control their rising  fiscal budgets.261 For example,  in  the Shapiro 
decision,  the state of Connecticut argued  that the statutory residency 
257. Id. at 541 (quoting King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 318­19 (1968)). 
258. While Jefferson solidifies a new federalist outlook, it is also worth mentioning 
here that this case could also have been explored through the lens of the Equal Protection 
Clause. One of the main arguments advanced by the appellants was that it was unfair to 
provide the predominantly white advanced aged and the disabled with higher payments than 
the predominately Black AFDC recipients. Id. at 546­47. Dispensing funds in this manner 
was not only unfair on its face but also distributed along racial lines. The Supreme Court, in 
one line dismissed these arguments as “unproved allegations of racial discrimination” and 
instead admonished that there is no federal constitutional or statutory requirement that relief 
provided under AFDC or OAA or AB or APTD be treated exactly alike. Id. And with this, 
the decision signaled the end of any interpretation of welfare by the Supreme Court as a 
constitutional right. 
259. See generally MICHAEL K. BROWN, RACE, MONEY, AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE 
STATE (1999); MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
WELFARE IN AMERICA (rev. ed. 1996); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN 
SOCIAL POLICY, 1950­1980 (2d ed. 1994); FRANCIS FOX PIVEN AND RICHARD CLOWARD, 
REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE (Vintage Books, 2d ed. 1993); 
MIKE DAVIS, PRISONERS OF THE AMERICAN DREAM: POLITICS AND ECONOMY IN THE HISTORY 
OF THE U.S. WORKING CLASS (1986). 
260. See, e.g., Lyng v. UAW, 481 U.S. 368, 372 (1987); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 
U.S. 618, 623 (1969). 
261. Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 623. 
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requirement was necessary “to  protect its fisc[al concerns] by discouraging 
entry of those who  come needing  relief.”262 Unless these arguments were in 
direct conflict with the SSA or violated a fundamental right (as in Shapiro), the 
Supreme Court gave deference to the state. 
In the fiscally conservative era, states used various policy tactics to keep 
their welfare budgets and  rolls low,  including  child  exclusion  laws (also 
referred  to  as the “family cap” rules),263 “man  in  the house” rules,264 and 
residency requirements.265 As discussed  earlier,  the “family cap” rule 
discouraged mothers from continuing  to  have more children,  reportedly in 
order to receive increased welfare payments.266 Within the larger policy agenda 
of centrist Democratic President Bill Clinton, 1996 set the stage to “end welfare 
as we know it,” a policy approach  strengthened  by the backdrop of new 
litigation.  The Supreme Court retreated  from recipient advocacy and  most 
policy decisions regarding  the administration  of welfare benefits were left to 
the discretion of the state within the “new federalist” philosophy. 
Despite scarce rulings, a 1995 case decided  during  the Clinton 
Administration  foreshadowed  the fiscally conservative parameters of future 
welfare policy.267 In Anderson v. Edwards, Verna Edwards was caring for her 
granddaughter while receiving  benefits from AFDC on her granddaughter’s 
behalf.268 In order to prevent her two grandnieces from going into foster care, 
Ms.  Edwards also  began  caring  for them.269 The grandnieces were also 
receiving AFDC and Ms. Edwards was not under any legal obligation to care 
for any of the children.270 In  1984, Congress amended  the SSA and  counted 
parents,  children,  and grandparents who  lived  together as one family unit for 
payment purposes under AFDC.271 Subsequently,  California also  changed  its 
law to include all extended family living together as a part of one single family 
unit for purposes of calculating AFDC benefits.272 Under the new rule, when 
the state calculated the financial need of a family, it included all money coming 
262. Id. 
263. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970) (sustaining a Maryland 
AFDC regulation under which “the standard of need increases with each additional person in 
the household, but the increments become proportionately smaller”). 
264. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968); see also discussion supra Part II. 
265. See generally, Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 618 (invalidating a statutory provision 
denying welfare assistance to residents of a state who had not resided within that jurisdiction 
for at least one year). 
266. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 473­74. 
267. Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 (1995). 
268. Id. at 148. 
269. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits at 8­10, Anderson v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 143 
(1994) (No. 93­1883). 
270. Id. at 6. 
271. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98­369, § 2640(a), 98 Stat. 1145 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(38)­(39) (1991)). 
272. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 146­48. 
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into  the home from any sources and reduced  the AFDC check accordingly.273 
As a result of this change in  law, Ms. Edwards’ AFDC payment was reduced 
by over $200.00.274 
The Supreme Court’s ruling  in Anderson affirmed  states’ rights to 
implement family reduction  plans if all children,  regardless of kinship or 
obligations to financially support, lived in the same household.275 Under federal 
AFDC standards,  children  received  higher benefits if they were considered 
children  of separate family  units that simply live together (a difference of 
$200).276 However, in order to save money and to establish lower benefit levels, 
the state of California grouped all children living in the same household as one 
single family.277 This ruling  was emblematic of the Supreme Court’s move 
from a new federalist to  a fiscal conservative approach,  making  the state’s 
budgetary concerns for scaling  back  welfare expenditures a legitimate 
consideration  within  the bounds of Supreme Court decisions about welfare 
legislation.278 
In  fact,  a real conflict did  exist between  state and  federal guidelines for 
family welfare benefits. While federal benefits approved of a reduction scheme 
similar to  the one adopted by California,  a state was only allowed  to  use the 
income of the recipient in  order to  calculate his or her financial need.279 In 
Anderson,  by combining  family units based  upon  residency,  California was 
able to  consider the income of anyone in  the home to  calculate the financial 
need, even if everyone in the home did not share that income.280 The Supreme 
Court ignored  this clear conflict with  SSA in  favor of state fiscal concerns. 
Consequently,  instead  of preempting  state statutes via federal guidelines,  the 
Supreme Court held  that the state’s legislation was not inconsistent with  the 
philosophy of the federal program.281 States could,  therefore,  control their 
welfare budgets by grouping children cared for by the same person into a single 
family unit.282 
273. Id. at 154. 
274. Id. Prior to the consolidated family unit rule, Ms. Edward’s received $341 for her 
granddaughter and $560 for her grandnieces. Id. at 148; see also Irma S. Jurado, Anderson v. 
Edwards: Can Two Live More Cheaply Than One? The Effect of Cohabitation on AFDC 
Grants, 26 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 301, 322 (1996). 
275. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 157­58. 
276. Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 371 (1987). For a limited discussion of Justice 
Scalia’s statutory interpretations in Lukhard v. Reed, see Stephen A. Plass, The Illusion and 
Allure of Textualism, 40 VILL. L. REV. 93, 117­19 (1995) and Elizabeth A. Liess, Comment, 
Censoring Legislative History: Justice Scalia on the Use of Legislative History in Statutory 
Interpretation, 72 NEB. L. REV. 568, 581­82 (1993). 
277. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 146­47. 
278. See Anderson, 514 U.S. at 152. 
279. Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, supra note 269, at 12. 
280. Anderson, 514 U.S. at 146­47. 
281. See Anderson, 514 U.S. at 143. 
282. Id. at 145­46. 
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The clear implication of the Anderson case was that conservative policy­
makers had  retreated  from the policy of providing  for America’s poor,  using 
monetary caps to preserve fiscal budgets and put the poor on the road to work. 
Other examples of this fiscally conservative approach  are represented in  the 
significant cases, Lukhard v. Reed283 and Lyng v. UAW.284 
The fiscal conservative approach  unabashedly initiated  a purely pro­
capitalist (as opposed  to  labor) stance on  welfare entitlement by repressing 
labor activism through  loss of benefits and  by decreasing  welfare payments 
through  the recalculation  of what income would  reduce a recipient’s aid.  In 
1981,  Congress passed  the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation  Act of 1981 
(OBRA),  designed  to  reduce the federal budget.285 One section  of OBRA 
purported to make families ineligible for aid if they received income exceeding 
the need level determined by a particular state.286 Based on the federal statute, 
income was never defined.287 This gave states the freedom to create their own 
parameters. 
In Lukhard v. Reed, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether a 
civil judgment for personal injury should be calculated as a welfare recipient’s 
income for calculating  eligibility.288 The state of Virginia included lump sum 
payments of personal injury awards as income,  for purposes of determining 
eligibility.289 Ona Mae Reed received  a lump sum personal injury payment 
which  she used  for household  living  expenses. 290 This lump sum payment 
subsequently disqualified  her from AFDC funds.291 Ms.  Reed  argued  that 
counting  personal injury payments as income violated  federal law.292 Under 
OBRA, the period of ineligibility for benefits depended on whether a personal 
injury award was deemed as income or assets.293 If the personal injury award 
was considered income,294 the state could deny aid to the welfare recipient for 
as long as the money should last if the person received that monthly economic 
equivalent from the state.295 However,  if the personal injury award  were 
considered an asset, Ms. Reed would only lose aid for the month in which the 
283. 481 U.S. 368 (1987). 
284. 485 U.S. 360 (1988). 
285. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97­35, 95 Stat. 736­737 
(codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1981)). 
286. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 371. 
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(17) (1982 & Supp. at 111). 
288. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 371; see supra note 276. 
289. Lukhard, 481 U.S. at 372­73. 
290. Id. at 386 (Powell, J. dissenting). 
291. Id. at 391 (Powell, J. dissenting). 
292. Id. at 373. 
293. Id. at 371. 
294. “‘Income may be defined as the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from 
both combined,’ provided it be understood to include profit gained through a sale or 
conversion of capital assets . . .” Id. at 374­75 (quoting Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 
207 (1920)). 
295. Id. at 372. 
             
               
     
               
                   
                   
                  
               
   
           
             
                   
                     
             
             
   
                     
           
               
     
             
               
                   
                 
                   
         
                 
               
           
                   
               
                     






         
                           
                     
                           
 
     
                           
 
               
     
37 2008] IN SUPREME JUDGMENT OF THE POOR 
personal injury award  was received.296 Labeling  a personal injury award  as 
income could be particularly devastating to a permanently disabled mother. 
The Supreme Court upheld Virginia’s classification of the personal injury 
award  as income,  declaring that it was not inconsistent with  the OBRA and 
AFDC statutes, which allowed the state to reduce its budget at the expense of 
the welfare recipient.297 Lukhard embodied the rising hegemonic force of fiscal 
conservatism and  its evaluative cost benefit standards over and  above family 
need and social justice. 
In Lyng v. UAW, welfare recipients were forced to choose between social 
activism and social welfare benefits.298 In OBRA, Congress decided that those 
who faced a temporary loss of income due to  their position on the picket line 
would be ineligible for food stamps.299 Mary Berry went on strike because her 
union and employer could not reach an agreement regarding  the terms of her 
employment contract.300 While the strike continued, Ms. Berry received strike 
insurance benefits for her living expenses.301 Subsequently, she applied for food 
stamps to  supplement the insurance but was rejected on  the basis of her 
participation in the strike.302 Ms. Berry argued among other things, that OBRA 
violated the Equal Protection Clause because it denied eligibility to strikers but 
allowed those who quit their employment to be eligible.303 
The Supreme Court summarily dismissed  this equal protection  claim 
instead opting to evaluate the merits of this case based on “protecting the fiscal 
integrity of Government programs.”304 Using  fiscal integrity as a guise for 
“maintaining neutrality in private labor disputes,” the Supreme Court was able 
to  mask  a clear bias against labor activism.305 While not directly stated,  the 
Supreme Court’s ruling suggested that providing aid to strikers would drain the 
fiscal resources preserved for those deemed  now not just morally,  but 
politically worthy of welfare benefits.  Therefore, a certain  level of 
discrimination  by Congress is warranted  (and  obviously approved  by the 
Supreme Court) in order to preserve benefits for the “deserving poor.” These 
cases powerfully demonstrate the degree to which marketplace poverty became 
an  indicator of moral failings that,  at least by this time,  the Supreme Court 
decided  could  only be remedied  by the public policy ideology of fiscal 
conservatism. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. at 383. 
298. 485 U.S. 360, 360 (1988). 
299. Id. at 371; see also Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97­
35, 95 Stat. 736­737 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2015(d)(3) (1981)). 
300. Brief for Appellees at 16, Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (No. 86­1471). 
301. Id. 
302. Id. at 16­17. 
303. UAW v. Lyng, 648 F. Supp. 1234, 1243 (D.C.C. 1985), rev’d, 485 U.S. 360 
(1988). 
304. Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 373 (1988). 
305. Id. at 372­73. 
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CONCLUSION 
These Supreme Court cases are both  reflective of,  and  at the same time 
have, shaped America’s welfare policies and public opinion. The first Supreme 
Court cases under examination  established  that the Supreme Court was 
interested  in  protecting  equal rights and  due process while working  within 
existing  frameworks of governance.306 The most monumental cases for this 
stage of the welfare legal legacy were Shapiro v. Thompson and Goldberg v. 
Kelly in which the Supreme Court’s rulings came pretty close to nationalizing 
AFDC and  establishing  a right to  welfare.  However,  the Supreme Court 
concluded that “the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right 
to  governmental aid,  even  where such  aid  may be necessary to  secure life, 
liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 
individual.”307 Additionally, the Supreme Court rejected  constitutional 
mandates for “necessities of life” or declaring  these “necessities” as 
“fundamental interests” of the individual.308 Further,  the Supreme Court also 
failed  to  provide a remedy for economic conditions that may discriminately 
prevent or augment access to the “universal” civil and political rights that allow 
a citizen to act.309 
The Supreme Court was also  interested  in preserving grander notions of 
federalism.  Such  federal and  state governing  techniques ranged  from 
“cooperative federalism” to “new federalism.” While the line shifted  in  the 
balance of power between state and  federal authority,  there was a consistent 
Supreme Court mandate that state policies adhere,  at some level,  to  federal 
guidelines.310 When  the shift to  “fiscal conservatism” emerged,  however, 
decisions by the Supreme Court ultimately led  toward  a more cost­benefit 
deference to  a states’ rights approach  and  away from concepts of federal 
authority,  fundamental rights,  and/or Due Process.  AFDC decisions by the 
Supreme Court endorsed  federalism and  granted  the recipient legislative 
entitlement status, but AFDC was never established as a constitutional right.311 
Moving  into  the twenty­first century,  the idea of welfare as a federal 
entitlement or even  as a federal program has become a thing of the past. 
306. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 645 (1969) (Warren, J., 
dissenting); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). 
307. DeShaney v. Winnebago Co. Dep’t. of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989). 
308. See generally Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (sustaining an amendment 
denying public funding for medically necessary abortions); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 
(1972) (rejecting a constitutional guarantee of minimum shelter); Dandridge v. Williams, 
397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970) (sustaining a Maryland AFDC regulation under which “the 
standard of need increases with each additional person in the household, but the increments 
become proportionately smaller.”). 
309. See Lyng v. UAW, 485 U.S. 360 (1988) (validating a 1981 amendment which 
denied eligibility for food stamps if a member of the household went on strike). 
310. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 
282 (1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); see also N.Y. State Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. 
Dublino, 413 U.S. 405 (1973). 
311. King, 392 U.S. at 325­27. 
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Unfortunately,  Temporary Aid  to  Needy Families, (TANF)312 a short­term 
relief program has become the superficially and  inadequate response to  the 
long­term poverty problem. The landscape of long­term poverty is laden with 
policy judgments based  intentionally,  subconsciously or consequentially on 
considerations of race and gender. 
With  such emphasis placed on  “the law,” the Supreme Court appears to 
hold  itself above the fray of public opinion,  but welfare policy exposes this 
perspective as a fallacy. As critical race scholars have long shown, the Supreme 
Court may not be able to change the law,  but the Justices’ beliefs about 
responsibility and deservedness heavily inform their decisions about the spirit 
of the law.313 The inescapable conclusion  is that a gendered  and  racially 
unequal pro­capitalist socio­economy has profoundly shaped the “neutral” laws 
surrounding  welfare policy.  Pro­capitalism and  fiscal conservatism,  for 
example,  are at the intersection  of a national attack  on the “welfare queen” 
albatross.  The Supreme Court has both  responded  to  and  helped  shape that 
intersection . . . and that attack. Though political analysts and activists have so 
far been  reluctant to  acknowledge the Court’s role in welfare policy, welfare 
advocates would be well­advised  to  plan  future pro­welfare initiatives with  a 
full understanding of the role the Supreme Court might play in influencing the 
success of those efforts. 
312. Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), Pub. L. No. 104­193, 111 Stat. 2105 
(1996) (as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601). 
313. See, e.g. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest­
Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523 (1980) (introducing interest convergence 
theory which suggests that the white majority will advocate for advantages or benefits for 
black people only if advocating for these benefits will also advance white self­interest.); see 
also MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 26 (2000) (using Bell’s interest convergence theory and applying it in the case 
of the Cold War). 
